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Abstract
Using a linked employer-employee data set of the German manufacturing sector, 
this paper analyses the role of exporting establishments in explaining rising wage 
dispersion. Over the period of analysis (1996–2007), the raw wage diﬀ  erential between 
exporters and domestic establishments increased substantially, which can only partly 
be attributed to corresponding changes in human capital endowments and the returns 
to them. These ﬁ  ndings are consistent with recent heterogeneous-ﬁ  rm trade models that 
feature an exporter wage premium as well as variability of the premium with respect 
to increasing trade liberalization. A decomposition analysis shows that the increase 
in the conditional wage gap indeed contributed to rising wage inequality both within 
and between skill groups. In contrast, the growing employment share of exporters 
contributed to a reduction in wage dispersion.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: F16, J31
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In recent decades, wage dispersion both within and between demographic groups
has increased in most industrialized countries.1 This rise has occurred against the
background of an accelerating globalization, leading to renewed interest in the dis-
tributional consequences of international trade within countries despite the fact that
earlier research failed to uncover an important contribution of globalization to wage
inequality (Katz and Autor, 1999). As pointed out by Krugman (2008), most of
this research is based on data that is outdated by now. Moreover, it may not have
captured all relevant transmission channels as it hardly made use of ﬁrm-level data
(Bernard and Jensen, 1997, being the exception) and exclusively focused on skill-
wage diﬀerentials, neglecting potential eﬀects on wage inequality within skill groups.
Recent theoretical contributions (e.g., Helpman et al., 2010; Egger and Kreicke-
meier, 2009) suggest that the link between international trade and wage dispersion
works through the wage diﬀerential between exporters and non-exporters, which can
also arise in a setting of ex-ante identical workers. Indeed, the existence of an expor-
ter wage premium is backed up by abundant empirical work that was initiated by
Bernard and Jensen (1995) and is summarized in Schank et al. (2007).2 This wage
gap can aﬀect total wage dispersion over time via two channels. First, the share of
workers employed at exporters may change, for example due to exporters becoming
larger or due to an increasing number of exporting relative to non-exporting plants.
Second, the size of the wage diﬀerential itself may change. As theory suggests, this
may happen due to, e.g., exporters beneﬁting the most from increasing globalization,
leading them to share some of the (additional) gains with their workers.
The present study takes the aforementioned theories to the data. It explores
both of the suggested channels and quantiﬁes their respective contributions to the
rise in wage dispersion, making use of linked employer-employee data for the German
manufacturing sector in the time period 1996 to 2007. For this purpose, a variant of
the popular Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition (Juhn et al., 1993) is applied. The
latter allows for the decomposition of changes in any distributional metric and, thus,
for separate investigations of lower-tail and upper-tail wage inequality. Moreover,
1Autor et al. (2008) provide evidence for the US, Goos and Manning (2007) for the UK, and
Dustmann et al. (2009) for Germany.
2Moreover, an important ﬁnding of empirical studies based on linked employer-employee data
is that the premium is only partly accounted for by diﬀerences in observable and unobservable
worker characteristics (Schank et al., 2007; Munch and Skaksen, 2008; Fr´ ıas et al., 2009).
4changes in skill compositions and skill prices can be taken into account, thereby
bringing intra-group inequality into focus.
The case of Germany is particularly interesting since it is not only the largest
economy in the European Union but also very open to trade, regularly featuring
the highest export levels of the world. Furthermore, over the period of analysis,
Germany’s integration with its European neighbours and the world economy fur-
ther increased as the following developments illustrate. First, in 1999, the euro was
introduced as common currency in initially 11 countries (now 16), arguably leading
to reduced transaction costs in cross-border operations, the elimination of exchange
rate uncertainties, and greater market transparency. Second, China with its huge
market and production potential continued its trade expansion, which was accele-
rated by its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.3 And third, the
enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 27 member states took place, with
many of the new members being just at Germany’s doorstep.4
This paper is related to a small literature analysing the role of exporting plants
in driving changes in wage inequality.5 Using US plant-level data for the period 1973
to 1987, Bernard and Jensen (1997) ﬁnd that employment shifts between plants and
particularly from non-exporters to exporters can account for the largest part of the
increase in the wage gap between high- and low-skilled workers.6 The authors suggest
that the exporters’ higher demand for skill is responsible for this result. Recently,
3Indeed, in recent years, trade ﬂows between Germany and China have been growing at a much
faster rate than Germany’s total trade. Between 1996 and 2007, the share of exports to China
in total exports increased from 1.38 to 3.10 percent, while the share of imports from China in
total imports rose from 2.61 to 7.33 percent (Source: German Federal Statistical Oﬃce). While
the importance of China as an export market may still seem limited, the increasing availability of
cheaper imports may well serve as a catalyst for third-country exports.
4Ten new member states mostly from Central and Eastern Europe joined in 2004, two (Romania
and Bulgaria) did so in 2007. However, it has to be pointed out that the ﬁrst agreements concerning
free merchandise trade between the EU and some of the accession countries were already phasing
in at the beginning of the 1990s as part of the accession process, thus already before the period of
analysis (“Europe Agreements”). Still, one would expect a further deepening of trade integration
to have occurred after 1996 since tariﬀs were reduced gradually. Furthermore, the enlargement
may have led to a reduction in bilateral trade costs through other channels, as well, such as better
institutions, more eﬃcient border controls, etc.
5Another related strand of the literature investigates the development of between-ﬁrm (and
within-ﬁrm) wage dispersion over time (e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger, 1991; Dunne et al., 2004;
Faggio et al., 2010). These studies conclude that it is the between-ﬁrm component that is mainly
responsible for changes in overall wage dispersion, but they do not explore the role of the ﬁrms’
trade status in this context.
6Due to the lack of more detailed information, the authors have to rely on the frequently used
but rather crude distinction between non-production and production workers.
5employing the linked employer-employee data set that is also used in this study, Klein
et al. (2010) give a thorough account of how the exporter wage premium (or wage
discount) diﬀers by skill (as well as by gender and nationality). They ﬁnd that high-
skilled workers enjoy a wage premium, whereas low-skilled workers suﬀer from a wage
discount, implying skill-related wage inequality within exporting plants. They do not
explore, however, if and how this translates into changing skill wage diﬀerentials over
time. Both papers deal with the between-group dimension of wage inequality but
abstract from within-group wage inequality. Moreover, they do not relate exports to
more general measures of wage dispersion such as the standard deviation or certain
interquantile ranges, which are standard in the inequality literature. This paper
aims to ﬁll these gaps.
The main ﬁndings of this study are as follows. First, in the period from 1996 to
2007, the wage diﬀerential between exporters and non-exporters increased by almost
eight log points, which is substantial. Second, changes in skill compositions and
skill prices can only account for a small fraction of this increase. Third, the rising
exporter wage gap indeed contributed to the growth in wage dispersion, whereas
the increase in the exporters’ share in total employment worked towards a reduction
in wage dispersion. The resulting net eﬀect of exporting is positive but moderate.
Fourth, these contributions indeed relate predominantly to wage dispersion within
skill groups.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief account of the
theoretical background. Section 3 describes the data set used for the empirical ana-
lysis. Section 4 presents trends in the incidence of exporting and the exporter wage
gap in German manufacturing. Section 5 explains the methodology for the decom-
position of changes in the wage distribution and presents the decomposition results.
Section 6 provides the results of two extensions to the baseline decomposition, and
Section 7 summarizes and discusses the main ﬁndings.
2 Theoretical background
Most theoretical contributions aiming to explain the observed exporter wage gap
are elaborated within the inﬂuential framework of Melitz (2003), which features mo-
nopolistic competition in the product market, ﬁxed and variable costs of exporting,
and ﬁrms with heterogeneous productivity levels. Only the most productive ﬁrms
6ﬁnd it worthwhile to export, and they are also the ones that end up with the highest
revenues, proﬁts, and employment levels. Note that in the original model of Melitz
(2003), there are no wage diﬀerences between exporters and domestic ﬁrms because
labour is assumed to be homogeneous and the labour market to be completely fric-
tionless. However, wage diﬀerences can easily arise if the base version of the model
is extended.
Fr´ ıas et al. (2009) give an extensive account of the suggested theoretical me-
chanisms. The authors classify them into two broad categories: the ones featuring
neoclassical labour markets on one side and the ones containing some source of
labour market imperfections on the other. In the former class of models, wage diﬀe-
rences reﬂect corresponding diﬀerences in worker skill levels, thus not representing
true premia. The leading example is the technology-choice model by Yeaple (2005)
or Bustos (2010). The same mechanism can also arise in the setting proposed by
Verhoogen (2008) where exported products need to be of higher quality than pro-
ducts solely sold on the domestic market. If high-skilled workers are needed to
produce high-quality goods and if high-skilled workers have to be paid higher wages
than low-skilled workers, the wage diﬀerential between exporters and non-exporters
again emerges.
Note that one important implication of these models is that any wage diﬀerential
should disappear once worker heterogeneity is controlled for. As explained before,
this prediction has not received a lot of empirical support.7 In contrast, in the se-
cond class of models, ex-ante identical workers earn more at exporters than they
would in the outside labour market, which may be induced by search and matching
frictions in conjunction with imperfect and costly screening of worker ability (Help-
man et al., 2010), eﬃciency wages (Davis and Harrigan, 2007), or fair-wage eﬀort
mechanisms (Amiti and Davis, 2008; Egger and Kreickemeier, 2008, 2009, 2010).
In these settings, ﬁrm heterogeneity as opposed to worker heterogeneity leads to
observed wage diﬀerentials.
What are the predictions of the theoretical models regarding the eﬀects of trade
7It should be mentioned that Yeaple (2005) prefers a broader interpretation of his skill mea-
sure than simply education. According to him, skills could also relate to worker quality that is
unobserved by the econometrician but observed by the ﬁrm. Under this interpretation, the model
is much harder to test empirically. Probably, the work by Fr´ ıas et al. (2009) comes closest as they
allow for time-varying returns to unobserved individual ability. They still ﬁnd, however, that it
is the plant component of average wages and not the worker component that reacts to a positive
trade shock.
7liberalization on the wage structure? According to Yeaple (2005), there should be
an increase in the between-ﬁrm wage diﬀerential which is equivalent to an increase
in the wage diﬀerential between skill groups. There is no eﬀect on intra-group
inequality because the model does not feature a true exporter wage premium.
In contrast, in Davis and Harrigan (2007) and Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), the
wage diﬀerential between ﬁrms is not aﬀected in the process of globalization. This is
because wages paid to workers depend directly (and exclusively) on the monitoring
technology and the productivity of the ﬁrm, respectively, which are exogenous and
constant by construction. Still, there is growing intra-group inequality, which arises
through the channel of ﬁrm selection and associated worker reallocations.
Finally, in Helpman et al. (2010) and Egger and Kreickemeier (2008, 2010), trade
liberalization aﬀects the wage structure through both channels, worker reallocation
and the size of the wage diﬀerential between ﬁrms. In these settings, wages depend
(directly or indirectly) on ﬁrms’ proﬁts or revenues, which are variable. In particular,
they are responsive to trade liberalization and rise stronger for more productive
ﬁrms. Whereas the relationship between trade liberalization and the exporter wage
premium is monotonic, this is not the case for aggregate wage inequality. There
are two opposing forces. On the one hand, existing and new exporters are able to
increase proﬁts and wages the most, thus increasing wage dispersion ceteris paribus.
On the other hand, the tougher competitive environment leads the least productive
and lowest-wage ﬁrms to exit, thus reducing wage dispersion ceteris paribus.T h e
former eﬀect dominates as long as the initial level of trade openness is not too
high. Hence, a move from autarky to trade will always lead to higher inequality but
gradual trade liberalization such as a lowering of ﬁxed or variable trade costs not
necessarily. Obviously, the latter case is the empirically relevant one in our context.
3D a t a
The data set used for the analysis is the German LIAB, the linked employer-
employee data set provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).8 It
combines the Employment Statistics with the IAB Establishment Panel. Alda et al.
(2005) give a detailed description of the data set.
8The LIAB data are conﬁdential but not exclusive. They are available for non-commercial
research by visiting the research data centre of the German Federal Employment Agency at the
IAB in Nuremberg, Germany. See http://fdz.iab.de/en.aspx for further information.
8The Employment Statistics are administrative social security records, which are
based on notiﬁcations made by employers on behalf of their employees to the social
security authorities at the beginning and end of each employment spell. Moreover,
employers send an updating report at the end of each calendar year. Hence, only
workers covered by social security are included in the Employment Statistics, whe-
reas civil servants and the self-employed are not. This covers roughly 80 percent
of all employees in Germany and even a considerably larger share when it comes
to private-sector employment in the manufacturing sector, which is the focus of
the subsequent analysis. The information given in the Employment Statistics in-
cludes certain demographic characteristics of the individual (year of birth, gender,
nationality, level of education/training9) and the (top-coded) daily wage.
The employer side of the data set is given by the IAB Establishment Panel, a
stratiﬁed sample of all the establishments included in the Employment Statistics.
Strata are deﬁned over industries and size classes, with larger establishments being
oversampled.10 The IAB Establishment Panel started in 1993 with 4,265 plants in
West Germany. East German establishments were included in the Establishment
Panel from 1996 onwards. After taking in several waves of additional establishments,
the sample size increased to about 16,000 in 2007, which is the last available wave
at the time of the analysis. Although participation is voluntary, the response rate of
repeatedly interviewed establishments is quite high, amounting to about 80 percent.
The survey is very detailed, and although questions concerning labour demand are
the main focus, many diﬀerent areas are covered. Most importantly for the analysis
at hand, the share of exports in sales is surveyed in every year.
The IAB establishment Panel and the Employment Statistics can be merged
via a common establishment identiﬁer. The worker information refers to the 30th
of June of each year, the date of reference for the Establishment Panel. In line
with related research (e.g., Dustmann et al., 2009), I restrict attention to full-time
9I deﬁne four educational categories. 1) Low: no vocational training, no high-school; 2) Me-
dium: high-school and/or vocational training; 3) High: university or technical college. The fourth
category consists of observations with missing educational information, which aﬀects about ﬁve
percent of the sample. To improve the quality of the education variable in the German social
security data, Fitzenberger et al. (2006) propose an imputation procedure that relies on extrapo-
lation of past and future information. However, their approach is geared towards the complete
employment biographies contained in the IABS and of less use in the (cross-sectional version of
the) LIAB data. This is because most workers in the LIAB are only observed at one employer
and the recorded educational information does usually not change between diﬀerent notiﬁcations
of the same employer.
10Sampling weights are given and ensure that the results are representative for the population.
9male workers in regular employment. That is, I discard apprentices, trainees, the
marginal and part-time employed, individuals younger than 18 or older than 65 as
well as workers who are currently on leave due to military service, child-bearing,
etc. Workers who hold multiple jobs or draw some form of beneﬁts at the same
time are also excluded. Furthermore, I focus on the manufacturing sector because
information on establishments’ exports is more patchy for other sectors. Finally,
the years 1996 to 2007 constitute the sample period since this is the maximum time
span covering the whole of (the reuniﬁed) Germany.
The dependent variable in the empirical analysis is the real log daily wage, inclu-
ding bonus payments. However, the wage information in the Employment Statistics
is rightcensored at the contribution ceiling to the social security system. In the
sample at hand, between 10 and 14 percent of the wage observations are top-coded
each year. In order not to bias the regression results, I replace censored wages with
imputed wages. The imputation procedure works in the following way (cf. Gart-
ner, 2005). In a ﬁrst step, I run a series of tobit regressions, separately for each
year and education group.11 The explanatory variables are ﬁve age-group dummies,
industry and federal state dummies, and – because it is of crucial importance for
the analysis – a dummy variable for exporting establishments. Rightcensored ob-
servations are then replaced by a draw from a truncated normal distribution where
the contribution ceiling gives the lower truncation limit and the two moments of
the distribution are obtained from the corresponding tobit estimation. Note that
similar imputation strategies are generally applied in analyses using this data set
(cf. Schank et al., 2007; Dustmann et al., 2009; Guertzgen, 2009). Imputed and
non-censored wages are then converted into constant year-2000 euros by deﬂating
them with the Consumer Price Index as provided by the German Federal Statistical
Oﬃce.
4 Trends in exports and the exporter wage gap
Consistent with prior expectations, Germany’s degree of integration with the
world economy increased considerably between 1996 and 2007 as can be seen from
the summary statistics in Table 1. According to the LIAB data, the share of ex-
porters increased by 34.44 percent, and the share of exports in sales conditional on
11The results of these tobit estimations are available upon request.
10exporting rose by 57.51 percent. Hence, both the extensive and the intensive mar-
gin contributed to the substantial rise in overall export intensity. The employment
share of exporters is much higher than their share in the number of establishments,
reﬂecting the well-known fact that exporters are in general much larger than purely
domestic establishments. Interestingly, however, even though the employment share
of exporters also increased, it did so to a lesser extent.12 For a comparison, the
table also includes information on the exports-to-GDP ratio as given by oﬃcial sta-
tistics. Since the empirical analysis is based on the manufacturing sector, attention
is restricted to goods trade, which however (still) accounts for close to 90 percent
of all German trade. As can be seen, the globalization trends in the establishment
data are not an artefact of the data but mirrored by a strong and quantitatively
comparable rise in oﬃcial trade ﬁgures. For the sake of completeness, information
on the imports-to-GDP ratio is also listed. The latter made an enormous jump, too,
which is not surprising as imports and exports are two sides of the same coin.
Over the same time period, the wage diﬀerential between individuals employed
by exporters and the ones employed by non-exporters also rose. Figure 1 depicts
the mean raw diﬀerence and the associated 95-percent conﬁdence interval over time.
Note that these mean diﬀerences are calculated at the worker level by estimating
the following year-speciﬁc log wage regressions:
lnwijt = β0t + β1tExpjt + uijt, (1)
where i denotes the individual, j the establishment he is employed at, and t the year
of the observation. Expjt is a binary indicator that equals one if establishment j is
an exporter. The standard error of β1 used to construct the conﬁdence interval is
clustered at the level of the establishment.
From 1996 to 2007, the raw log wage gap increased from 0.223 to 0.298 and thus,
by 7.5 log points or 34 percent.13 Apart from a peak in 1997, the gap remained
quite stable until 2003 and began to rise thereafter. There is also some indication
that wage dispersion increased over time as the widened conﬁdence interval in later
12This employment measure refers to total employment as surveyed in the Establishment Panel.
When considering only the individuals included in the wage regressions, that is, full-time male
workers aged 18 to 65 as given by the administrative Employment Statistics, the respective shares
are 63.77 percent (1996) and 70.22 percent (2007), which is equivalent to a growth rate of 10.11
percent.
13This diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant as a t-test reveals (p-value: 0.0357).
11years shows.
In order to interpret the results in light of the theory, it is important to know to
what extent the exporter raw wage gap and its change over time can be explained
by (changes in) observable characteristics. Therefore, I repeat the previous exercise
but now control for several worker characteristics:






jtβRt + uijt. (2)
The vector Xit contains dummy variables for age×education groups14, a quadratic
term in tenure, a dummy variable for foreign nationality, and a dummy variable
that equals one if the individual has the position of a master craftsman or foreman.
Moreover, dummy variable sets for the industry (Ijt) and for the federal state (Rjt)
are also included.15 Note that by running year-speciﬁc regressions, I allow for both a
changing distribution of worker characteristics between exporters and non-exporters
as well as changing returns to these characteristics. Figure 2 shows how the condi-
tional wage gap evolved over time. It becomes apparent that the conditional wage
diﬀerence drops to about half of the raw gap but remains substantial. Moreover,
there is again a pronounced upward trend over the period of analysis. The increase
in the conditional gap between 1996 and 2007 amounts to 5.4 log points, which is
more than 70 percent of the increase in the raw gap.16 That is, it is indeed the case
that exporters pay higher wages to observationally identical workers, and this wage
advantage is increasing over time. Hence, simple theories relying on worker sorting
cannot account for this pattern.17
In a further step, I estimate the conditional wage diﬀerential after controlling
not only for the variables listed above but also for several additional establishment
characteristics:








jtβRt + uijt. (3)
14This is the approach chosen by Dustmann et al. (2009). I distinguish ﬁve age categories (18–25
years, 26–35 years, 36–45 years, 46–55 years, and 56–65 years) and the four levels of education as
described in footnote 9. This leads to twenty groups, one of which is omitted in the regression.
15Theoretical models of the exporter wage premium that build on the work of Melitz (2003)
predict that wage diﬀerences arise between ﬁrms within the same industry.
16Moreover, this diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant (p-value: 0.0027).
17So far, this refers to sorting on observables. Workers could still diﬀer in their unobservable
characteristics, however, and the distribution of the latter may have changed over time. This
possibility will be explored below.
12The vector Zjt consists of a quadratic term of log total employment in establishment
j, a dummy variable that equals one if the self-assessed technology status is state
of the art, a dummy variable that equals one if the establishment is not part of
a larger group, a dummy variable for the existence of a works council, and two
dummy variables that equal one if the establishment follows an industry-level or
a ﬁrm-level collective agreement, respectively. The estimated coeﬃcients of the
export dummy variable are displayed in Figure 3. As can be seen, the latter drops
considerably, being 0.013 in 1996, dropping to -0.008 in 1999 and rising to 0.030
in 2007.18 The correlation is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the years 2005 to
2007. Hence, other establishment characteristics can explain a good fraction of
the gap that remains after controlling for worker characteristics but particularly in
more recent years not all of it. At this point, it is worth mentioning that none of
the theoretical contributions cited above actually predicts that there should be an
exporter wage premium that is not accounted for by returns to other (selected) ﬁrm
characteristics. This is because the models in the heterogeneous-ﬁrm framework are
in general able to relate diﬀerent variables to one “suﬃcient statistic” (Melitz, 2003,
p. 1696), the ﬁrm productivity level. For example, according to theory, ﬁrms with
a higher productivity grow larger and also ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to export. Hence,
in a structural regression, there would be no room for the inclusion of both ﬁrm size
and the export status among the regressors.19
Industry heterogeneity
The trends in the propensity to export and the exporter wage gap discussed so
far relate to the manufacturing sector as a whole. Table 2 adopts a narrower pers-
pective and displays these trends by industry. Although there is some heterogeneity
in the level values, the upward trend is a general feature and not driven by industry
18Note that the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients between 1996 and 2007 is not statistically signiﬁcant
(p-value: 0.2776) but the diﬀerence between 1999 and 2007 is (p-value: 0.0176).
19Also see the discussion in Helpman et al. (2010, p. 1256). In empirical work, Verhoogen
(2008) and Fr´ ıas et al. (2009) adopt such a structurally motivated approach and focus on the ﬁrm
productivity level as the only regressor of interest. Note that both total employment and the
propensity to export are among their alternative proxies for productivity. The others are domestic
sales, sales per worker, and total factor productivity. The authors state that all proxies lead to
similar results. In the present study, I discarded the possibility of focusing on productivity instead
of exporting since productivity measures are diﬃcult to construct based on the data at hand. For
instance, information on sales is missing for a considerable fraction of the observations. Moreover,
as far as production inputs are concerned, information on the capital stock is not available.
13outliers. The employment share of exporters increased in 10 out of the 14 industries
and the conditional exporter wage gap (estimated using Equation 2) even in 11 out
of 14, although the diﬀerence in the export coeﬃcient is not always statistically
signiﬁcant. The largest increase in the exporters’ employment share occurred in the
industry “Shipbuilding and aircraft”, while the conditional exporter wage gap rose
most strongly in the industry “Precision mechanics” – two technologically rather ad-
vanced industries. The largest industry in the manufacturing sector as measured by
employment, “Machinery and equipment”, is also one of the most internationalized
ones with one of the highest employment shares of exporters.
Switchers vs stayers and the role of unobserved heterogeneity
The evolution of the exporter wage gap is measured on repeated cross-sections
of the manufacturing sector. Although establishments are in principle repeatedly
sampled and interviewed, only a small fraction of individuals can be observed in
both of the limiting years 1996 and 2007. This is due to establishments leaving and
joining the panel but also due to worker turnover that occurs over such a fairly long
time span. Only in rare cases can movers be followed over time since for this to
happen, the respective individual has to move from one sampled establishment to
another. Notwithstanding, knowing whether the increase in the exporter wage gap is
mainly due to a divergent wage growth of the existing workforce at existing exporters
and non-exporters or, in contrast, is driven by establishments switching their export
status or by workers moving from a non-exporting to an exporting establishment
and vice versa is certainly of interest. For example, it can help to determine to what
extent the (changing) selection of workers into exporters and non-exporters based
on unobservable characteristics – that possibly are important determinants of wages
in their own right – are able to explain the (changing) correlation of wages with the
export status.
Table 3 contains information on the development of wages and wage residuals,
respectively, for a balanced sample of individuals, diﬀerentiating by their export
status in 1996 and 2007. For those individuals that changed their export status
between the two years additional information is given on whether this switch involved
a change in establishments. Wage residuals are obtained from log wage regressions on
the worker characteristics speciﬁed above as well as industry dummies and federal
state dummies. As can be seen, the unweighted number of observations of this
14balanced sample is indeed low relative to the unbalanced sample but still reasonably
large in absolute terms.
The ﬁndings are as follows. Permanent export workers have the highest wages
in both years, whereas the opposite is true for permanent non-export workers. The
raw gap between these two groups increased by eleven log points, which is more
than the increase in the exporter wage gap for the full sample. The same is true for
the increase in the wage residuals gap, i.e., that part of wages that is not explained
by individual, industry and regional characteristics. Note that this pattern cannot
be accounted for by time-constant individual heterogeneity.20 Looking at the wage
residuals of future establishment movers and export switchers also indicates that
selection based on time-constant unobservables can only be part of the story. The
underlying assumption is that wage residuals represent both unobserved skills and
the returns to them (cf. Juhn et al., 1993). It is true that in 1996, unexplained wages
of future movers from non-exporters to exporters are, on average, higher than the
ones of non-export stayers, whereas future movers from exporters to non-exporters
have, on average, lower wage residuals than export stayers. These ﬁndings lend
some support to the selection-on-unobservables hypothesis. However, unexplained
wages of future non-export-to-export movers are lower than the ones of movers into
the opposite direction, indicating that the changing composition of unobservable
individual-speciﬁc skills does not explain the change in the gap. What clearly be-
comes apparent, however, is that a switch from non-exporting to exporting and, in
particular, a move from a non-exporter to an exporter are both associated with the
highest increases in unexplained wages.
How do these ﬁndings relate to the theoretical explanations discussed in Sec-
tion 2? Since the wage gap between exporters and non-exporters increased even for
the same workers employed at the same ﬁrms with the same export status, theo-
ries featuring a time-constant between-ﬁrm wage diﬀerential or none at all are not
consistent with the data. In contrast, it seems to be the case that the exporter wage
premium rises in a period of increasing trade liberalization as suggested by Helpman
et al. (2010) or Egger and Kreickemeier (2008, 2010). In Helpman et al. (2010), an
increase in the wage premium is accompanied by a corresponding increase in ave-
rage (unobserved) worker ability. It is tempting to say that the analysis of the wage
residuals of future export switchers and ﬁrm movers does not lend support to this
20Restricting the sample further to ﬁrm stayers gives the same result. Hence, time-constant
ﬁrm- or match-speciﬁc heterogeneity cannot be the reason, either.
15proposition. However, there are two caveats to such a statement. First, the balanced
sample of workers is a reduced one and does not contain information on hires from
non-sampled establishments. Second, and more importantly, Helpman et al. (2010)
allow for two interpretations of worker ability. Under the ﬁrst one, it represents
some form of general ability, which would be more diﬃcult to reconcile with the
data. Yet under the second one, it is match-speciﬁc and independently distributed
across worker-ﬁrm matches. Hence, wage residuals from 1996 may only partly be
informative about unobserved worker ability in 2007. Clearly, a deeper investiga-
tion of which of the suggested wage-premium mechanisms is of highest relevance in
practice is a promising route for future research.
5 The exporter wage gap and overall wage dis-
persion
5.1 Trends in wage dispersion
Table 4 documents that wage dispersion in the German manufacturing sector rose
considerably between 1996 and 2007, thus only conﬁrming the ﬁndings of the existing
literature (e.g., Dustmann et al., 2009). When decomposing the standard deviation
into a between-establishment and a within-establishment component, it turns out
that the former rose much faster. This is in line with the evidence presented, e.g., on
the US (Dunne et al., 2004) or the UK (Faggio et al., 2010). It also underscores the
need for research on factors inﬂuencing between-ﬁrm wage diﬀerentials in order to
understand the recent changes in the German wage structure. Inequality measures
based on interquantile ranges also conﬁrm the increase in wage dispersion. Following
Dustmann et al. (2009), I measure upper-tail wage inequality by the gap between the
85th and the 50th percentile of log wages and lower-tail wage inequality by the 50-15
log wage gap. Note that both measures are not aﬀected by the wage imputation
procedure for top-coded wages since less than 15 percent of the observations are
censored. It can be seen that wage dispersion at the bottom increased by more than
wage dispersion at the top.21
21However, the 85-50 log wage diﬀerential is a very conservative measure of upper-tail wage
inequality. For example, Piketty and Saez (2003) document for the US that (wage) income increased
particularly at the very top of the distribution, that is, above the 90th percentile. Unfortunately,
due to top-coding, this issue cannot be analysed properly with the data used in this study.
165.2 Methodology: decomposing changes in wage dispersion
over time
A ﬁrst approach to analyse the role of the exporter wage gap in explaining (rising)
wage inequality in Germany is to adopt a simple accounting framework as has been
done, for example, by Blau and Kahn (1996) in their study on the eﬀect of unionism
on wage inequality. That is, the overall variance of log wages in time period t can
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where σ2
t denotes the overall variance of log wages, αdt the share of individuals
employed at purely domestic establishments, σ2
dt and σ2
et the variances within the
non-exporting and the exporting sector, respectively, ¯ wdt and ¯ wet their respective
average log wages, and ¯ wt the average log wage across all employees. As becomes
apparent from the last two terms in Equation (4), in an accounting sense, the expor-
ter wage gap is one factor contributing to overall wage dispersion. This framework
can also be used to decompose changes in the variance of log wages over time into
four diﬀerent components, one of which is attributable to changes in the wage gap
(cf. Appendix A for details).
In a second step, I apply a variant of the more evolved regression-based decom-
position of Juhn et al. (JMP, 1993). In particular, I apply the method proposed by
Lemieux (2002), which combines elements of JMP with the reweighting approach
suggested by DiNardo et al. (DFL, 1996). The general idea is to decompose changes
in the wage distribution into three components: changes in observable characteris-
tics, changes in the prices for these characteristics, and changes in residual inequa-
lity. Thus, this decomposition can be thought of as an extension to the techniques
pioneered by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), which are popular tools for the
decomposition of mean diﬀerences. Starting point are the year-speciﬁc Mincerian
wage equations for the years t and s,
lnwil = X

ilβl + uil for l = t,s (5)
with uil = F
−1
l (θil|Xil). θil denotes the rank of individual i in the cumulative resi-
dual distribution of the corresponding year. It is possible to generate counterfactual
log wage distributions by varying prices (coeﬃcients), characteristics and the resi-
17dual distribution. Holding characteristics and residuals constant but changing the


























Assuming an exact correspondence between the individual ranks in the residual
distributions of the two time periods, it holds that22
lnw
C3
it =l nwis. (9)
Comparing distributional measures such as the variance or the interdecile range for
lnwit and lnwC1
it gives the contribution of changing coeﬃcients. The diﬀerence bet-
ween lnwC1
it and lnwC2
it is due to changes in the distribution of covariates (characte-
ristics), and ﬁnally, the comparison between lnwC2
it and lnwis yields the contribution
of changes in residual inequality.
A change in the coeﬃcients is easily implemented by using the OLS estimates of
Equation (5). However, it is more diﬃcult to account for changes in the distribution
of the covariates. As suggested by Lemieux (2002), the DFL reweighting approach
may be used for this purpose. The idea is to give more (less) weight to observations
that are more (less) likely to be observed in period s as compared to period t.
Speciﬁcally, DFL propose to pool the data for the two time periods and estimate
the probability of being observed in period s conditional on the set of characteristics
Xi. Denote this probability as Pis = Pr(period = s|Xi). The DFL reweighting
22Admittedly, this single-index interpretation of the wage residual is a strong one as it ignores
issues such as (changes in) measurement error (Lemieux, 2006).
18factor then is
ψi =( Pis/(1 − Pis)) ∗ ((1 − Ps)/Ps), (10)
with Ps denoting the unconditional mean, that is, the fraction of individuals ob-
served in period s. Applying this weighting factor to the observations in period t
simulates the change in the distribution of covariates that occurred between per-
iods t and s. If the observations cannot be divided in a limited number of cells,
the predicted probabilities ˆ Pis can be easily estimated parametrically using a logit
(alternatively, a probit) model. One explicit advantage of the method proposed
by Lemieux (2002) is that the reweighting takes into account that changes in the
distribution of the covariates may also aﬀect the residual distribution. This is the
case if heteroskedasticity is present and the dispersion of the residuals increases in,
e.g., the level of educational attainment. In contrast, several other implementations
of JMP, such as the one by Blau and Kahn (1996), only consider changes in the
unconditional residual distribution.
The main virtue of the JMP decomposition is that it explicitly distinguishes
observed prices from the residuals. In contrast, a pure DFL decomposition only
considers the eﬀect of varying characteristics, while between-group and residual
prices are lumped together. Similarly, the decomposition based on regressions of
recentered inﬂuence functions as recently suggested by Firpo et al. (2009, 2007) only
allows for the distinction of a composition (characteristics) and a combined wage
structure eﬀect. Thus, both alternatives would not be able to single out the eﬀect of
a change in the exporter wage gap as well as in the returns to other characteristics.
Of course, the main interest of this paper is not to determine the contributions
of the three components in the aggregate but to isolate the eﬀects of the increasing
wage diﬀerential between exporters and non-exporters as well as the increasing share
of workers employed at exporting establishments. In the case of the coeﬃcient or
price eﬀect, this can be done by only changing the coeﬃcient of the export dummy
while leaving all other coeﬃcients unaltered. Furthermore – and this is is the second
advantage of combining the original JMP decomposition with DFL reweighting as
suggested by Lemieux (2002) – DiNardo et al. (1996) show how one can disentangle
the contribution of a binary covariate to the characteristics eﬀect. In particular, the
authors propose to construct the weight for the binary variable of interest according
to changes in the conditional distribution over time, given the other characteristics.
In contrast to the alternative of focusing on the marginal distribution, this takes
19account of the joint distribution of all the covariates.
For example, in the present application, it might be the case that the increase
in the share of workers employed at exporters is partly driven by industry shifts,
with trade-intensive industries growing over time. One would not like to attribute
this hypothetical development to an exporting characteristics eﬀect. In practice,
changes in the conditional propensity to export can be calculated by estimating
– separately for each of the two years – a logit model with the export status as
dependent variable, yielding two sets of coeﬃcients and accordingly, two sets of
predicted probabilities, which can be used for the reweighting. To arrive at the
weight for the overall characteristics eﬀect in a second step, the conditional weight
for the binary variable is multiplied with the unconditional weight for all remaining
variables. This leads to a sequential decomposition in the following order: 1) export
coeﬃcient eﬀect, 2) coeﬃcient eﬀect attributable to remaining variables, 3) export
characteristics eﬀect, 4) characteristics eﬀect attributable to remaining variables,
and 5) residual eﬀect. However, one well-known caveat to the whole procedure is
its path dependency. That is, the estimated contributions of each element and of
the aggregate components depend on the order of the decomposition. Therefore, to
check the robustness, I perform the whole decomposition – except for the residual
eﬀect, which still comes last – in reverse order, as well (cf. DiNardo et al., 1996).
My preferred regression model for the decomposition is given by Equation (2)
and thus includes, apart from the export dummy, standard human capital controls
as well as industry and region dummies. As argued in Section 4, this speciﬁcation
has the closest connection to heterogeneous-ﬁrm trade models. In an extension,
the regression given by Equation (3) is used for the decomposition. The latter
speciﬁcation adds several other ﬁrm characteristics and hence, might be able to
explain a larger part of the change in wage dispersion. However, the drawback is
that it becomes more diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀect of exporting if – in line with
theoretical predictions – diﬀerent ﬁrm characteristics such as size, technology, and
the export status are closely interrelated.
Throughout the analysis, statistical inference is based on a bootstrap (200 repli-
cations) of the whole decomposition. To account for the correlation of wages within
establishments, a block bootstrap procedure is applied where all observations within
an establishment are resampled.
Despite the high popularity in many economic applications, there are important
caveats to any decomposition analysis of this type, which should not be concealed. In
20particular, the decomposition abstracts from general equilibrium eﬀects and assumes
that changes in quantities do not aﬀect changes in prices. Moreover, exporting (as
well as the industry) is treated as an individual characteristic.23 This implies that a
selection into the two groups of exporters and non-exporters based on unobservables
is ruled out. Admittedly, this is a strong assumption. However, as discussed earlier,
at least the increase in the wage gap does not seem to be caused by changing selection
patterns. In fact, the observed increase in the conditional exporter wage gap is even
higher if the sample is restricted to workers that never switched their export status.
A further assumption behind the decomposition is that there are no spillover eﬀects
between exporters and non-exporters.
5.3 Empirical results
Table 5 displays the results of the simple decomposition of the log wage va-
riance outlined in Equation (4) and expanded on in Appendix A. It turns out that
by far the largest part of the increase (about 91 percent) occurred within the non-
exporting and exporting sectors. As becomes evident from Panel a), wage dispersion
among non-exporters rose by more than wage dispersion among exporters. With 10.3
percent of the total, the contribution of the rising wage diﬀerential between expor-
ters and non-exporters was moderate but non-negligible. In contrast, the changing
employment shares of the two establishment groups worked towards a reduction
in wage dispersion, albeit to a very small extent. The reason is that the share of
workers in the group whose wages are relatively close to the grand mean (i.e., the
ones employed at exporters) further increased. In that sense, workers became more
homogeneous over time. This decomposition gives a ﬁrst indication of the relative
magnitudes of diﬀerent components but is overly simplistic. In particular, it does
not take into account simultaneous changes in the workforce composition and in the
returns to skill or other observable characteristics, and it does not allow for a dis-
tinction between developments at the top and the bottom of the wage distribution,
respectively.
Therefore, in a next step, I conduct the regression-based Juhn-Murphy-Pierce
type decomposition, applying the method proposed by Lemieux (2002). The latter
is applied to the four wage dispersion measures listed above, that is, the standard
23This is also the approach adopted in the decomposition studies focusing on the eﬀect of
unionization on the wage distribution (e.g., DiNardo et al., 1996; Blau and Kahn, 1996; Dustmann
et al., 2009).
21deviation of log wages, the 85-15 log wage diﬀerential, the 85-50 log wage diﬀerential,
and the 50-15 log wage diﬀerential. The decomposition results are displayed in
Table 6.
Focusing ﬁrst on the aggregate components, changes in coeﬃcients explain the
largest part of rising wage inequality, irrespective of the measure used. Their contri-
bution ranges from 53 percent for the standard deviation to 75 percent for the 50-15
log wage diﬀerential.24 Changes in characteristics contribute between 1 (50-15) and
18 (85-50) percent, leaving between one fourth and one third of the total for rising
residual inequality.
As already suggested by the variance decomposition above, the coeﬃcient eﬀect
of exporting is a source of rising wage dispersion. The former contributes 0.8 log
points or 8.9 percent to the increase in the standard deviation of log wages and
11.7 percent to the rise in the 85-15 log wage diﬀerential, respectively, which is
mainly driven by its contribution to lower-tail wage dispersion. Thus, despite the
more evolved decomposition method and the inclusion of human capital, region
and industry characteristics in the model, the order of magnitude of the estimated
exporter wage gap eﬀect is very similar to the one found using the simple variance
decomposition.
On the other hand, the changing employment share at exporting establishments
– conditional on the other covariates – tends to work against increasing inequality.
This characteristics eﬀect of exporting is negative for the standard deviation of log
wages (−5.6 percent), the 85-15 diﬀerential (−7.8 percent) and, in particular, the
50-15 diﬀerential (−13.1 percent). It is almost negligible (0.7 percent) for the 85-50
diﬀerential. These ﬁgures are larger (in absolute terms) than the ones obtained by
the simple variance decomposition. Recall that the intuitive explanation for the
negative impact put forward before was that the high share of workers employed at
exporters further increased, leading to rising homogeneity in that respect. Therefore,
one cautious interpretation of the larger ﬁgures obtained now is that, conditional
on covariates, this increase in the employment share of exporters was even more
pronounced.
As already explained, the results are not innocuous to the sequence of the de-
24These ﬁgures are large but not unreasonable. For example, Gernandt and Pfeiﬀer (2007) apply
the (original) JMP decomposition and ﬁnd that price eﬀects explain about half of the increase in
wage dispersion for West German workers in the period 1994 to 2005 – without including any
employer-related characteristics among their regressors.
22composition. Therefore, I perform the decomposition in reverse order, as well. That
is, now the eﬀect of changing human capital, industry, and region characteristics is
calculated ﬁrst, followed in turn by the export characteristics eﬀect, the coeﬃcient
eﬀect attributable to the (remaining) control variables, and ﬁnally, by the coeﬃcient
eﬀect of exporting. The results remain qualitatively the same, although the quan-
titative importance of the components change to some extent. In particular, the
aggregate characteristics eﬀect becomes larger and the aggregate coeﬃcient eﬀect
smaller. Recalling the sequence of the decomposition, this indicates that changes
in characteristics matter more given 1996 prices than given 2007 prices. Similarly,
changes in prices matter more given 1996 characteristics than given 2007 characte-
ristics. This ﬁnding largely holds for the marginal contribution of exporting, too.
That is, both the positive coeﬃcient eﬀect and the negative characteristics eﬀect of
exporting become smaller in absolute terms.25 In that respect, the change in the
characteristics eﬀect is in general more pronounced than the change in the coeﬃcient
eﬀect, which is particularly true for the 50-15 diﬀerential.
With the coeﬃcient eﬀect and the characteristics eﬀect working in opposite direc-
tions, what is the overall contribution of exporting to rising inequality? The answer
to this question depends on the sequence of the decomposition. With the excep-
tion of the 85-50 diﬀerential, the net eﬀect is larger according to the reverse-order
decomposition. There, it is highest for the 50-15 log wage diﬀerential, amounting
to 0.8 log points or 7.8 percent of the overall increase. Interestingly, averaging the
net contributions over both sequences, the net exporting eﬀect totals around ﬁve
percent for all of the four wage dispersion measures.
6 Extensions
6.1 The contribution of additional establishment characte-
ristics to the rise in wage dispersion
The only establishment characteristic controlled for in the decomposition discus-
sed in Section 5.3 was the export status. I now base the decomposition on the regres-
sion given by Equation (3), thus accounting for several additional establishment-level
variables such as total employment, the technology status, and the existence of ﬁrm-
25A small exception is the characteristics eﬀect of exporting for the 85-50 diﬀerential, which
changes from positive to negative but remains insigniﬁcant.
23or industry-level collective agreements. Doing so is likely to increase the explained
part of the rise in wage dispersion but loosens the direct correspondence to the
theoretical models outlined in Section 2 and makes it diﬃcult to disentangle the
contribution of exporting. The results of this exercise are given in Table 7.
A ﬁrst inspection reveals that, indeed, the contribution of rising residual inequa-
lity substantially decreases. It even becomes negative for the 50-15 and the 85-15
diﬀerentials, thus implying that the model partly overexplains the increase in wage
dispersion, particularly at the bottom of the distribution. This increase in the ex-
plained part is almost exclusively due to a rise in the characteristics eﬀect, while the
coeﬃcient eﬀect is in general hardly altered.
As expected, conditional on several other establishment characteristics, the contri-
bution of exporting is diminished. According to the default-order decomposition,
the coeﬃcient eﬀect of exporting ranges from 2.2 percent (85-50 diﬀerential) to 4.8
percent (50-15 diﬀerential), while according to the reverse-order decomposition, the
respective contributions are 0.6 percent (85-50) and 3.8 percent (50-15). Thus, ra-
ther than increasing the aggregate coeﬃcient eﬀect, the additional covariates absorb
some of the export price eﬀect. This can be interpreted as a consequence of having
a close connection between diﬀerent establishment characteristics, which is well in
accordance with heterogeneous-ﬁrm trade theory. For example, from the summary
statistics contained in Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B, it follows that exporters
are not only larger but also make more often use of state-of-the-art technology. Mo-
reover, they are more frequently part of a larger group and more likely to have a
works council and to follow a collective bargaining agreement, which can in turn be
attributed – at least to some extent – to their size advantage.
Due to these interrelations, I also refrain from interpreting the estimated export
characteristics eﬀect in more detail. The implied counterfactual – only changing the
export status while keeping all other (establishment) characteristics constant – is not
reasonable on these grounds. Instead, I return to the aggregate characteristics eﬀect,
which in contrast to the aggregate coeﬃcient eﬀect increased considerably with the
inclusion of the additional variables. To obtain an idea of the likely reasons, it
is suggestive to identify the main changes in establishment characteristics between
1996 and 2007. Again referring to Tables B1 and B2, establishments became, on
average, larger, more technology-intensive, more often part of a larger group, and
in particular, less likely to follow a collective agreement. Dustmann et al. (2009)
point to this decline in unionization as an important factor behind the growth in
24wage inequality. Although not the focus of the paper, my results are in line with
this claim.
6.2 Between- vs within-group wage dispersion
The analysis focuses on the eﬀect of exporting on inequality while conditioning on
changes in the skill composition and changes in the returns to skill. This suggests
that within- rather than between-group wage dispersion should be aﬀected. To
explore this issue in more detail, I redo the decomposition for the standard deviations
of log wages within and between age×education groups, respectively. I focus on the
standard deviation since – diﬀerent from most other measures – the within- and the
between-component of the variance add up to the total. For the sake of brevity,
I only list the results of the main (parsimonious) model speciﬁcation as given by
Equation (2) (cf. Table 8).
A ﬁrst result to note is that changes in characteristics and coeﬃcients explain 81
percent of the increase in between-group but only 57 percent of the rise in within-
group wage inequality. This is not surprising given that the age×education dummies
are part of the model. However, the exporting eﬀect is indeed more pronounced for
the within-group standard deviation. The coeﬃcient eﬀect of exporting amounts
to 11.1 percent and the characteristics eﬀect to −5.7 percent (reverse order: 10.8
percent and −4.5 percent, respectively). In contrast, according to the default-order
decomposition, the coeﬃcient eﬀect contributes only 4.7 percent and the charac-
teristics eﬀect −5.2 percent to the total increase in the between-group standard
deviation. While reversing the order of the decomposition hardly aﬀects the export
coeﬃcient eﬀect (4.2 percent), the characteristics eﬀect appears to be less stable and
turns positive (2.8 percent).
7 Summary and discussion
Using linked employer-employee data for the German manufacturing sector and
conducting a variant of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition proposed by Le-
mieux (2002), this paper has explored the role of exporting establishments in ex-
plaining the rise in wage dispersion over the years 1996 to 2007. This particular
transmission channel between globalization and wage inequality is at the core of
recent theoretical contributions based on heterogeneous ﬁrms. The period of analy-
25sis is of particular interest since during these years, European and global economic
integration increased substantially.
The main ﬁndings of the analysis are the following. The exporter raw wage gap
made an enormous jump and increased by almost eight log points, more than half
of which cannot be explained by changes in observable worker, industry and region
characteristics, and the returns to them. This increase in the conditional wage
diﬀerential indeed contributed to growing wage inequality, predominantly within
skill groups. In contrast, the growing employment share of exporting establishments
worked towards a reduction in wage dispersion. The net contribution to the rise in
inequality is positive but moderate, lying in the range of ﬁve percent according to
the preferred model speciﬁcation.
These ﬁndings are consistent with theories that feature an exporter wage pre-
mium which rises with increasing trade liberalization (e.g., Helpman et al., 2010;
Egger and Kreickemeier, 2008, 2010). Furthermore, according to these theories,
gradual trade liberalization should have a non-monotonic (hump-shaped) eﬀect on
wage inequality where the latter increases as long as the initial degree of trade
openness is not too high. Taking these predictions seriously, this suggests that the
turning point has not yet been reached in Germany. Trade theory, however, is not
able to explain all of the increase in wage inequality, particularly not the one oc-
curring within the group of non-exporting ﬁrms. In fact, a reduction in ﬁxed or
variable trade costs should lower the range of non-exporters (and of their wages),
with the most productive ones starting to trade internationally and the weakest ones
leaving the market altogether due to a tougher competitive environment. As this
paper conﬁrms, changes in general labour market conditions such as the decline in
unionization are important explanatory factors in this respect since they are likely
to have lowered the implicit wage ﬂoor. To the extent that these trends are also dri-
ven by global competitive pressures, the direct contribution of exporters addressed
in this analysis only partly captures the eﬀect of globalization on the rise in wage
inequality.
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the mean raw log wage gap (solid line) and the associated
95-percent conﬁdence interval (dashed lines) obtained from the year-speciﬁc regressions
lnwijt = β0t + β1tExpjt + uijt. Regressions employ sampling weights, and clustering at
the establishment level is taken into account.























1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
Note: The ﬁgure depicts the mean conditional log wage gap (solid line) and the
associated 95-percent conﬁdence interval (dashed lines) obtained from the year-speciﬁc
regressions lnwijt = β0t + β1tExpjt + X
itβXt + I
jtβIt + R
jtβRt + uijt. The vector Xit
contains worker characteristics, Ijt denotes industry dummies and Rjt federal state
dummies. Regressions employ sampling weights, and clustering at the establishment
level is taken into account.
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the mean conditional log wage gap (solid line) and the
associated 95-percent conﬁdence interval (dashed lines) obtained from the year-speciﬁc




jtβRt + uijt.T h e
vector Xit contains worker characteristics, Zjt establishment characteristics, Ijt denotes
industry dummies and Rjt federal state dummies. Regressions employ sampling weights,
and clustering at the establishment level is taken into account.
32Table 1: Exporting trends in German manufacturing
1996 2007 Change (in %)
Share of exporters 18.44 24.79 34.44
Export share in sales of exporters 19.62 30.91 57.51
Export share in sales of all establishments 3.62 7.66 111.74
Employment share of exporters
-A l lw o r k e r s 6 0 .87 64.55 6.05
- Regression sample 63.77 70.22 10.11
Ratio of goods exports to GDPa 21.43 40.40 88.50
Ratio of goods imports to GDPa 18.53 32.20 73.75
Source: LIAB, establishment-level data and German Federal Statistical Oﬃce (items
marked with a).
Note: Summary statistics of the LIAB data make use of sampling weights.
33Table 2: Trends in exporting and the exporter wage gap by industry
Industry Share in Empl. share of Conditional Exporter
empl. (%) exporters (%) Wage Gap
1996 2007 1996 2007 Change
Chemicals 5.32 87.56 79.22 −0.0362 −0.0117 0.0245
(0.0376) (0.0362) (0.0518)
Rubber and plastics 3.74 81.64 84.06 0.0151 0.0754 0.0604
(0.0263) (0.0438) (0.0511)
Non-metallic mineral products 4.04 51.01 49.42 −0.0210 −0.0299 −0.0090
(0.0375) (0.0487) (0.0625)
Metal production 10.58 67.16 72.85 0.1405∗ 0.1899∗ 0.0494
(0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0359)
Structural metal products 7.11 34.49 49.95 0.0826∗ 0.1775 0.0949
(0.0263) (0.1132) (0.1143)
Machinery and equipment 19.02 87.79 84.14 0.1174∗ 0.1379∗ 0.0205
(0.0412) (0.0347) (0.0537)
Vehicle manufacturing 9.99 57.46 51.50 0.2406∗ 0.2100∗ −0.0307
(0.0386) (0.0306) (0.0455)
Shipbuilding and aircraft 1.61 49.50 92.91 0.0761∗ 0.2319∗ 0.1559∗
(0.0234) (0.0749) (0.0786)
Electrical engineering 12.17 70.01 83.96 0.0850∗ 0.1001 0.0151
(0.0383) (0.0524) (0.0624)
Precision mechanics 5.34 75.17 76.72 0.1047∗ 0.3059∗ 0.2012∗
(0.0329) (0.0518) (0.0608)
Wood processing 5.14 44.20 62.17 0.0731 0.0979∗ 0.0248
(0.0397) (0.0285) (0.0479)
Paper and print 3.82 50.36 63.27 −0.0469 0.0896∗ 0.1366∗
(0.0304) (0.0424) (0.0509)
Textiles and clothing 2.72 65.82 66.97 0.0765 0.2411∗ 0.1646∗
(0.0589) (0.0399) (0.0707)
Food 9.40 28.56 46.16 0.2141∗ 0.2134∗ −0.0007
(0.0390) (0.0456) (0.0594)
Note: Column 2 contains the industry’s share in total manufacturing employment, averaged over the
two years 1996 and 2007. Columns 3 and 4 display the employment share of exporters within the stated
industry. All are based on the (weighted) number of observations in the regression sample. Columns
5 to 7 display the (change in the) conditional exporter wage gap, obtained from separate multivariate
regressions (Equation 2) by industry and year. Standard errors of the export coeﬃcients (in parentheses)
are clustered at the level of the establishment. ∗ denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5-percent level.
34Table 3: Switchers vs stayers and the change in the exporter wage gap
Obs Raw Wages Wage Residuals
1996 2007 Change 1996 2007 Change
D - D 2380 4.2765 4.3354 0.0589 −0.0719 −0.1482 −0.0763
(0.3028) (0.4265) (0.2515) (0.3029)
D - E stayer 6007 4.4495 4.5814 0.1319 −0.0787 −0.0374 0.0412
(0.3330) (0.4514) (0.2387) (0.3168)
mover 754 4.2505 4.5963 0.3458 −0.0538 0.0634 0.1173
(0.3179) (0.6030) (0.2276) (0.4168)
E - D stayer 1051 4.5176 4.6040 0.0864 0.0439 −0.0017 −0.0456
(0.3658) (0.3696) (0.2291) (0.2807)
mover 2416 4.4473 4.6297 0.1824 −0.0036 0.0341 0.0377
(0.2923) (0.3699) (0.2019) (0.2686)
E - E 74517 4.5581 4.7270 0.1689 0.0557 0.0510 −0.0046
(0.3237) (0.3717) (0.2325) (0.2842)
Note: The table displays the evolution of raw log wages and log wage residuals, res-
pectively, for a balanced sample of individuals, diﬀerentiating by their export status
in 1996 and 2007. The ﬁrst letter in the ﬁrst column denotes the export status in
1996 (D: domestic, E: exporter), the second letter the export status in 2007. For ex-
port switchers, the second column characterizes whether this switch occurred due to
establishments starting to export (stayers) or due to individuals moving from a non-
exporting to an exporting plant (mover). The third column displays the unweighted
number of observation for each category. Wage residuals have been obtained from
year-speciﬁc log wage regressions (on the full, unbalanced sample), using as controls a
set of age×education dummies, a quadratic term of establishment tenure, a dummy for
foreign nationality, a dummy for holding a position as a master craftsman or foreman
as well as industry dummies and federal state dummies. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. Regressions and summary statistics make use of sampling weights.
35Table 4: Trends in log wage inequality in German manufacturing
1996 2007 Change
Standard deviation:
- Total 0.367 0.461 0.094
- Between establishments 0.260 0.343 0.083
- Within establishments 0.258 0.307 0.049
85-15 0.712 0.875 0.163
85-50 0.409 0.471 0.062
50-15 0.303 0.405 0.101
Note: Summary statistics make use of sampling weights.
36Table 5: Decomposition of the changes in the log wage variance by export status
a) Evolution of components
1996 2007 Change
σ2 0.1344 0.2122 0.0778
σ2
d 0.1257 0.2143 0.0886
σ2
e 0.1214 0.1848 0.0634
αd 0.3623 0.2978 −0.0645
¯ w 4.4667 4.5315 0.0648
¯ wd 4.3247 4.3219 −0.0028
¯ we 4.5474 4.6203 0.0730
b) Decomposition results
[%]
Within-group variance eﬀect 0.0709 [91.14]
Within-group composition eﬀect −0.0003 [−0.35]
Between-group wage diﬀerential eﬀect 0.0081 [10.35]




Note: The table displays the results of the simple decomposition outlined in Section 5.2
and Appendix A. σ2: overall variance; σd
2: variance within the group of non-exporters;
σ2
e: variance within the group of exporters; αd: share of individuals employed at non-
exporters; ¯ w: average log wage; ¯ wd: average log wage at non-exporters; ¯ we: average
log wage at exporters. Contribution of each component to the overall increase in wage
dispersion given in square brackets (Panel b, column headed ‘[%]’). Decomposition
makes use of sampling weights.
37Table 6: Results of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce type decomposition: short model
sd 85-15 85-50 50-15
logs [%] logs [%] logs [%] logs [%]
Default order
Coeﬃcients Export 0.0083 [8.85] 0.0192 [11.73] 0.0041 [6.53] 0.0151 [14.93]
(0.0027) (0.0062) (0.0023) (0.0052)
Other 0.0417 [44.31] 0.0914 [55.88] 0.0302 [48.43] 0.0612 [60.47]
(0.0089) (0.0289) (0.0094) (0.0222)
Total 0.0500 [53.16] 0.1105 [67.60] 0.0343 [54.96] 0.0763 [75.39]
(0.0094) (0.0297) (0.0103) (0.0221)
Characteristics Export −0.0052 [−5.55] −0.0128 [−7.84] 0.0004 [0.70] −0.0133 [−13.10]
(0.0023) (0.0077) (0.0040) (0.0061)
Other 0.0171 [18.19] 0.0249 [15.26] 0.0105 [16.91] 0.0144 [14.24]
(0.0065) (0.0201) (0.0113) (0.0154)
Total 0.0119 [12.63] 0.0121 [7.42] 0.0110 [17.61] 0.0012 [1.14]
(0.0070) (0.0228) (0.0122) (0.0175)
Residual 0.0322 [34.21] 0.0408 [24.98] 0.0171 [27.44] 0.0237 [23.47]
(0.0068) (0.0195) (0.0167) (0.0121)
Total 0.0940 [100] 0.1635 [100] 0.0623 [100] 0.1012 [100]
(0.0123) (0.0296) (0.0229) (0.0122)
Reverse order
Characteristics Other 0.0197 [20.91] 0.0522 [31.92] 0.0258 [41.46] 0.0264 [26.05]
(0.0057) (0.0153) (0.0112) (0.0087)
Export −0.0017 [−1.77] −0.0064 [−3.93] −0.0005 [−0.81] −0.0059 [−5.85]
(0.0011) (0.0046) (0.0023) (0.0042)
Total 0.0180 [19.13] 0.0458 [27.99] 0.0253 [40.65] 0.0204 [20.19]
(0.0055) (0.0147) (0.0108) (0.0087)
Coeﬃcients Other 0.0361 [38.39] 0.0608 [37.16] 0.0175 [28.14] 0.0432 [42.72]
(0.0055) (0.0117) (0.0057) (0.0099)
Export 0.0078 [8.27] 0.0161 [9.87] 0.0024 [3.78] 0.0138 [13.62]
(0.0026) (0.0065) (0.0023) (0.0061)
Total 0.0439 [46.66] 0.0769 [47.03] 0.0199 [31.91] 0.0570 [56.34]
(0.0060) (0.0134) (0.0058) (0.0116)
Residual 0.0322 [34.21] 0.0408 [24.98] 0.0171 [27.44] 0.0237 [23.47]
(0.0068) (0.0195) (0.0167) (0.0121)
Total 0.0940 [100] 0.1635 [100] 0.0623 [100] 0.1012 [100]
(0.0123) (0.0296) (0.0229) (0.0122)
Note: sd: Increase in standard deviation of log wages between 1996 and 2007; 85-15/85-50/50-15:
increase in 85-15/85-50/50-15 log wage diﬀerential between 1996 and 2007. Decomposition as described
in Section 5.2, taking the year 1996 as reference. Variables contained in the vector ‘Other’: worker
characteristics (age×education dummies, quadratic term of establishment tenure, dummy for foreign
nationality, dummy for holding position as master craftsman or foreman), industry dummies and federal
state dummies. Order of elements from top to bottom gives order of sequential decomposition. Bootstrap
standard errors based on 200 repetitions given in parentheses. Contribution of each element to the overall
increase in wage dispersion given in square brackets (column headed ‘[%]’). Estimation makes use of
sampling weights.Table 7: Results of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce type decomposition: extended model
sd 85-15 85-50 50-15
logs [%] logs [%] logs [%] logs [%]
Default order
Coeﬃcients Export 0.0024 [2.55] 0.0063 [3.78] 0.0014 [2.22] 0.0049 [4.78]
(0.0023) (0.0057) (0.0019) (0.0043)
Other 0.0466 [48.69] 0.1019 [60.87] 0.0341 [52.36] 0.0678 [66.31]
(0.0066) (0.0199) (0.0097) (0.0137)
Total 0.0490 [51.23] 0.1082 [64.66] 0.0356 [54.58] 0.0727 [71.09]
(0.0066) (0.0196) (0.0102) (0.0128)
Characteristics Export −0.0005 [−0.55] −0.0010 [−0.60] 0.0008 [1.18] −0.0018 [−1.73]
(0.0030) (0.0083) (0.0046) (0.0064)
Other 0.0344 [35.98] 0.0791 [47.29] 0.0090 [13.81] 0.0702 [68.63]
(0.0094) (0.0237) (0.0146) (0.0182)
Total 0.0339 [35.43] 0.0781 [46.69] 0.0098 [14.99] 0.0684 [66.90]
(0.0101) (0.0259) (0.0158) (0.0193)
Residual 0.0128 [13.34] −0.0190 [−11.35] 0.0198 [30.43] −0.0388 [−37.99]
(0.0103) (0.0249) (0.0221) (0.0173)
Total 0.0957 [100] 0.1674 [100] 0.0652 [100] 0.1022 [100]
(0.0125) (0.0286) (0.0229) (0.0119)
Reverse order
Characteristics Other 0.0374 [39.03] 0.1022 [61.08] 0.0394 [60.49] 0.0628 [61.46]
(0.0086) (0.0223) (0.0130) (0.0163)
Export −0.0025 [−2.57] −0.0096 [−5.72] −0.0044 [−6.77] −0.0052 [−5.05]
(0.0016) (0.0071) (0.0031) (0.0057)
Total 0.0349 [36.46] 0.0927 [55.36] 0.0350 [53.72] 0.0577 [56.40]
(0.0084) (0.0210) (0.0123) (0.0160)
Coeﬃcients Other 0.0455 [47.52] 0.0894 [53.41] 0.0099 [15.22] 0.0795 [77.75]
(0.0056) (0.0169) (0.0095) (0.0138)
Export 0.0026 [2.68] 0.0043 [2.58] 0.0004 [0.62] 0.0039 [3.83]
(0.0023) (0.0062) (0.0017) (0.0055)
Total 0.0480 [50.20] 0.0937 [55.99] 0.0103 [15.85] 0.0834 [81.58]
(0.0054) (0.0165) (0.0098) (0.0133)
Residual 0.0128 [13.34] −0.0190 [−11.35] 0.0198 [30.43] −0.0388 [−37.99]
(0.0103) (0.0249) (0.0221) (0.0173)
Total 0.0957 [100] 0.1674 [100] 0.0652 [100] 0.1022 [100]
(0.0125) (0.0286) (0.0229) (0.0119)
Note: Variables contained in the vector ‘Other’: worker characteristics (age×education dummies, qua-
dratic term of establishment tenure, dummy for foreign nationality, dummy for holding position as mas-
ter craftsman or foreman), establishment characteristics (quadratic term of log total employment,
dummy for state-of-the-art technology status, dummy for not being part of a larger group, dummy for
the existence of a works council, two dummy variables for following an industry-level or a ﬁrm-level col-
lective agreement, respectively), industry dummies, and federal state dummies. See Table 6 for further
explanatory notes.Table 8: Results of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce type decomposition: between- vs
within-group wage dispersion, short model
sd between sd within
logs [%] logs [%]
Default order
Coeﬃcients Export 0.0030 [4.66] 0.0079 [11.14]
(0.0010) (0.0026)
Other 0.0275 [42.94] 0.0321 [45.26]
(0.0037) (0.0096)
Total 0.0305 [47.59] 0.0400 [56.41]
(0.0039) (0.0096)
Characteristics Export −0.0033 [−5.22] −0.0041 [−5.75]
(0.0027) (0.0022)
Other 0.0309 [48.30] 0.0003 [0.38]
(0.0077) (0.0059)
Total 0.0276 [43.08] −0.0038 [−5.37]
(0.0083) (0.0067)
Residual 0.0060 [9.33] 0.0347 [48.97]
(0.0076) (0.0052)
Total 0.0640 [100] 0.0709 [100]
(0.0122) (0.0081)
Reverse order
Characteristics Other 0.0240 [37.48] 0.0082 [11.62]
(0.0072) (0.0043)
Export 0.0018 [2.82] −0.0032 [−4.49]
(0.0014) (0.0015)
Total 0.0258 [40.30] 0.0051 [7.14]
(0.0072) (0.0040)
Coeﬃcients Other 0.0296 [46.21] 0.0235 [33.14]
(0.0046) (0.0050)
Export 0.0027 [4.16] 0.0076 [10.76]
(0.0010) (0.0025)
Total 0.0322 [50.37] 0.0311 [43.90]
(0.0047) (0.0055)
Residual 0.0060 [9.33] 0.0347 [48.97]
(0.0076) (0.0052)
Total 0.0640 [100] 0.0709 [100]
(0.0122) (0.0081)
Note: sd between/sd within: increase in standard deviation of log wages between and
within 20 age×education groups, respectively, between 1996 and 2007. See Table 6 for
further explanatory notes.
40Appendix
A Decomposing changes in the variance of log
wages
Starting from Equation (4), the change in the variance of log wages between two
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The term in the ﬁrst curly bracket captures changes in wage dispersion within
the two sectors (“within-group variance eﬀect”). The component in the second
curly bracket measures the contribution of changing employment shares in the high-
variance and low-variance sectors, respectively (“within-group composition eﬀect”).
The third component measures the eﬀect of changes in the wage gap between the
two sectors (“between-group wage diﬀerential eﬀect”). Finally, the component in
the fourth curly bracket measures the eﬀect of changing employment shares in the
sector whose wages are relatively far from the average (“between-group composition
eﬀect”).
41B Additional tables
Table B1: Summary statistics: 1996
All Non-Exporters Exporters
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Log daily real wage 4.467 0.367 4.325 0.354 4.547 0.348
Educ: missing 0.040 0.195 0.053 0.224 0.032 0.176
Educ: low 0.153 0.360 0.121 0.327 0.170 0.376
Educ: medium 0.730 0.444 0.785 0.411 0.698 0.459
Educ: high 0.078 0.268 0.041 0.198 0.099 0.299
Age: 18–25 0.077 0.266 0.097 0.296 0.066 0.248
Age: 26–35 0.326 0.469 0.355 0.479 0.309 0.462
Age: 36–45 0.286 0.452 0.273 0.445 0.293 0.455
Age: 46–55 0.220 0.415 0.198 0.399 0.233 0.423
Age: 56–65 0.091 0.287 0.077 0.266 0.099 0.298
Tenure (days) 2,976.596 2,529.430 2,242.922 2,225.117 3,393.379 2,596.246
Master craftsman, foreman 0.044 0.205 0.054 0.227 0.038 0.191
Foreign nationality 0.099 0.299 0.083 0.276 0.108 0.311
Est: Export 0.638 0.481 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Est: Log total employment* 5.059 2.016 3.575 1.591 5.911 1.718
Est: High technology* 0.207 0.405 0.196 0.397 0.213 0.410
Est: Not part of larger group* 0.584 0.493 0.724 0.447 0.504 0.500
Est: Works council* 0.694 0.461 0.431 0.495 0.845 0.362
Est: Collective agreement at industry level* 0.767 0.423 0.716 0.451 0.796 0.403
Est: Collective agreement at ﬁrm level* 0.114 0.318 0.092 0.290 0.127 0.333
Ind: Manuf. of chemical products 0.053 0.224 0.018 0.134 0.073 0.260
Ind: Manuf. of rubber and plastic products 0.037 0.190 0.019 0.136 0.048 0.214
Ind: Manuf. of non-metallic mineral products 0.040 0.197 0.055 0.227 0.032 0.177
Ind: Manuf. of iron and steel products 0.106 0.308 0.096 0.294 0.111 0.315
Ind: Manuf. of structural metal products 0.071 0.257 0.129 0.335 0.038 0.192
Ind: Manuf. of machinery and equipment 0.190 0.392 0.064 0.245 0.262 0.440
Ind: Manuf. of motor vehicles 0.100 0.300 0.117 0.322 0.090 0.286
Ind: Manuf. of ships and aircraft 0.016 0.126 0.022 0.148 0.012 0.111
Ind: Manuf. of electrical equipment 0.122 0.327 0.101 0.301 0.134 0.340
Ind: Manuf. of ﬁne mechanical products 0.053 0.225 0.037 0.188 0.063 0.243
Ind: Manuf. of wood and wood products 0.051 0.221 0.079 0.270 0.036 0.185
Ind: Manuf. of paper products; printing 0.038 0.192 0.052 0.223 0.030 0.171
Ind: Manuf. of textiles and textile products 0.027 0.163 0.026 0.158 0.028 0.165
Ind: Manuf. of food products 0.094 0.292 0.185 0.389 0.042 0.201
Reg: Schleswig-Holstein 0.018 0.132 0.014 0.118 0.020 0.139
Reg: Hamburg 0.018 0.133 0.026 0.159 0.013 0.115
Reg: Lower Saxony 0.104 0.306 0.119 0.324 0.096 0.295
Reg: Bremen 0.011 0.105 0.008 0.089 0.013 0.114
Reg: North Rhine-Westphalia 0.251 0.434 0.174 0.379 0.295 0.456
Reg: Hesse 0.070 0.256 0.057 0.231 0.078 0.268
Reg: Baden-W¨ urttemberg 0.152 0.359 0.123 0.328 0.169 0.374
Reg: Bavaria 0.146 0.353 0.119 0.323 0.161 0.367
Reg: Berlin 0.049 0.215 0.106 0.307 0.016 0.126
Reg: Brandenburg 0.018 0.132 0.032 0.177 0.009 0.096
Reg: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.011 0.106 0.022 0.148 0.005 0.072
Reg: Saxony 0.040 0.197 0.069 0.253 0.024 0.153
Reg: Saxony-Anhalt 0.023 0.148 0.040 0.196 0.013 0.112
Reg: Thuringia 0.024 0.154 0.037 0.189 0.017 0.129
Reg: Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland 0.065 0.246 0.055 0.228 0.071 0.256
Observations (unweighted) 565,163 68,245 496,918
Variables preceded by Est denote establishment characteristics. Establishment characteristics marked with * are included in
the extended regression model. Due to missing values they are based on 538,382 observations for the whole sample (67,884
at non-exporters and 470,498 at exporters). Summary statistics are calculated using sampling weights. The table displays
separate summary statistics for ﬁve age groups and four education categories. Note that in the regression, dummies for
age×education groups are used instead.
42Table B2: Summary statistics: 2007
All Non-Exporters Exporters
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Log daily real wage 4.531 0.461 4.322 0.463 4.620 0.430
Educ: missing 0.073 0.259 0.111 0.315 0.056 0.230
Educ: low 0.114 0.318 0.090 0.286 0.124 0.330
Educ: medium 0.711 0.453 0.745 0.436 0.697 0.460
Educ: high 0.102 0.303 0.054 0.225 0.123 0.329
Age: 18–25 0.072 0.259 0.090 0.286 0.065 0.246
Age: 26–35 0.193 0.395 0.215 0.411 0.184 0.387
Age: 36–45 0.333 0.471 0.316 0.465 0.341 0.474
Age: 46–55 0.288 0.453 0.267 0.442 0.297 0.457
Age: 56–65 0.113 0.316 0.112 0.316 0.113 0.317
Tenure (days) 4,059.487 3,168.611 3,481.807 2,927.754 4,304.480 3,234.397
Master craftsman, foreman 0.034 0.182 0.048 0.213 0.028 0.166
Foreign nationality 0.072 0.259 0.058 0.233 0.078 0.269
Est: Export 0.702 0.457 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Est: Log total employment* 5.445 2.072 3.891 1.687 6.099 1.860
Est: High technology* 0.224 0.417 0.182 0.386 0.241 0.428
Est: Not part of larger group* 0.525 0.499 0.719 0.449 0.443 0.497
Est: Works council* 0.682 0.466 0.389 0.487 0.806 0.395
Est: Collective agreement at industry level* 0.603 0.489 0.515 0.500 0.641 0.480
Est: Collective agreement at ﬁrm level* 0.093 0.290 0.080 0.271 0.098 0.297
Ind: Manufacture of chemical products 0.055 0.229 0.039 0.193 0.063 0.242
Ind: Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.042 0.201 0.023 0.149 0.051 0.219
Ind: Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 0.023 0.150 0.039 0.194 0.016 0.126
Ind: Manufacture of iron and steel products 0.164 0.371 0.150 0.357 0.171 0.376
Ind: Manufacture of structural metal products 0.012 0.109 0.020 0.141 0.009 0.092
Ind: Manufacture of machinery and equipment 0.171 0.376 0.091 0.287 0.204 0.403
Ind: Manufacture of motor vehicles 0.187 0.390 0.304 0.460 0.137 0.344
Ind: Manufacture of ships and aircraft 0.026 0.159 0.006 0.079 0.035 0.183
Ind: Manufacture of electrical equipment 0.119 0.323 0.064 0.245 0.142 0.349
Ind: Manufacture of ﬁne mechanical products 0.036 0.187 0.029 0.166 0.040 0.196
Ind: Manufacture of wood and wood products 0.040 0.196 0.051 0.220 0.035 0.185
Ind: Manufacture of paper products; printing 0.047 0.212 0.058 0.234 0.042 0.202
Ind: Manufacture of textiles and textile products 0.018 0.133 0.020 0.140 0.017 0.130
Ind: Manufacture of food products 0.059 0.236 0.107 0.309 0.039 0.194
Reg: Schleswig-Holstein 0.015 0.122 0.021 0.142 0.013 0.112
Reg: Hamburg 0.039 0.194 0.038 0.190 0.040 0.195
Reg: Lower Saxony 0.079 0.270 0.077 0.266 0.080 0.271
Reg: Bremen 0.006 0.078 0.010 0.098 0.005 0.068
Reg: North Rhine-Westphalia 0.212 0.409 0.229 0.420 0.205 0.403
Reg: Hesse 0.081 0.272 0.079 0.269 0.081 0.273
Reg: Baden-W¨ urttemberg 0.166 0.372 0.145 0.352 0.176 0.380
Reg: Bavaria 0.193 0.395 0.125 0.331 0.222 0.415
Reg: Berlin 0.015 0.122 0.023 0.148 0.012 0.109
Reg: Brandenburg 0.017 0.130 0.030 0.170 0.012 0.108
Reg: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.012 0.109 0.026 0.159 0.006 0.077
Reg: Saxony 0.044 0.206 0.061 0.239 0.037 0.190
Reg: Saxony-Anhalt 0.019 0.137 0.033 0.179 0.013 0.114
Reg: Thuringia 0.029 0.167 0.038 0.191 0.025 0.155
Reg: Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland 0.073 0.259 0.067 0.250 0.075 0.263
Observations (unweighted) 486,990 62,130 424,860
Note: Variables preceded by Est denote establishment characteristics. Establishment characteristics marked with * are included
in the extended regression model. Due to missing values they are based on 485,596 observations for the whole sample (61,810 at
non-exporters and 423,786 at exporters). Summary statistics are calculated using sampling weights. The table displays separate
summary statistics for ﬁve age groups and four education categories. Note that in the regression, dummies for age×education
groups are used instead.
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